The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
The Central Committee
A Political Report
• Internationalize the Palestinian cause and national rights, and to hold an international conference under the ceiling of the international legitimacy resolutions.
• Combine the political and diplomatic struggles and develop the popular resistance against occupation and colonization.
• A new policy based on the Central Council’s (CC) Resolutions taken in its session of March 4-5, 2015.
• Terminate the division and recover the internal unity in order to reinforce the national rise and build a new and substitute strategy for national struggle.
• Adopt a substitute socioeconomic policy to guarantee citizens’ dignity and living rights, and reinforce their steadfastness in the face of occupation and colonization.
• Confront the Authority’s attack on liberty of opinion, as well as syndical freedoms and rights, and stop the policy of neglecting the parliamentary blocs and the expanded use of presidential legislative powers.
• Terminate the division to save Gaza Strip from the catastrophe of destruction and siege, as well as the catastrophic deterioration of social conditions; open the crossing points; achieve reconstruction and bury the plans of separating Gaza Strip from the West Bank.
• The Joint Arab List’s win opens the door for struggle-based relations of a new kind between our people’s struggles all over its existence places.
• Abide by the policy of neutralizing the Palestinian existence in Syria, and secure the factors of survival for our people in Yarmouk Camp, as well as the other camps and shelters for displaced people.
• The DFLP calls for stopping the bet on the futile and vain negotiations, the conditions of which are known and low, under the American unilateral sponsorship, and for making a decisive decision in favor of a substitute political strategy. The CC Resolutions, taken in its 27th Session, reflect many of such strategy’s headlines which combine the Palestinian cause and national rights’ internationalization and the fight on field, within the framework of a comprehensive popular resistance which may develop to become a comprehensive national rebellion. In this context, the DFLP calls for ending the dealing with the CC Resolutions as a mere card for negotiations, the use of which is aimed to improve partially the low conditions of the negotiation process.
The DFLP believes that the necessary entry to such strategic steps is to end the division and to recover the internal unity on a basis of complete national partnership and within the framework of a unified Palestinian national platform, the headlines of which are the recent CC Resolutions.
Those issues have been stated in the Political Report issued on the meetings of the DFLP Central Committee, held in the second half of April, 2015, during which the Palestinian, Israeli and regional situations have been discussed, as well as the impacts thereof on our national cause and our people’s rights.
As stated in its Report, the DFLP believes that the CC 27th Session, held on 4-5 March, has been a distinguished Palestinian political station, the resolutions of which have disregarded any mention of the negotiation process and gave answers to a series of issues that had been subject to disagreement with the official Palestinian leadership, such as the stand from the negotiation process; activating the State of Palestine’s affiliation to international organizations, institutions and agencies, including the International Criminal Court; developing the popular resistance; terminating security coordination with the occupation; economic embargo; turning over the negotiation page; sticking to the choice of an independent sovereign State within the 4 June borders with East Jerusalem as its capital; sticking to the refugees’ right to return; rejecting decisively the State of Israel’s Judaism; rejecting the principle of land exchange; emphasizing the invitation to the Temporary Leadership Framework for an immediate meeting, as well as the invitation to the Government to formulate the resolutions and decrees that set the CC Resolutions into effect.
The DFLP notes that the Executive Committee’s (EC) decisive decision, which considers the CC Resolutions binding and not mere recommendations, does not mean that some currents have stopped betting on the return to negotiations and the use of these Resolutions as a mere card for negotiations, which aims to improve partially the negotiation conditions.
As for the American-supported French initiative to the Security Council (SC), the DFLP notes that the USA, taking into account that it is difficult to return to negotiations, seeks for new strong cards to reinforce its role in the Middle East and to revive the negotiation process and that the USA approaches the inferior French Draft Resolution to SC as a new means to manage the crisis and as an entry to reformulate the international legitimacy resolutions and to dodge the CC Resolutions. The seriousness of this plan, according to the DFLP, stems from the fact that it leads to reformulating the international legitimacy and its relevant resolutions, adopting new criteria derived from the American criteria for solution, and emptying the previous international resolutions, which acknowledge our Palestinian people’s legitimate rights, of their significance.
As for the situation in the Palestinian Bank and in the Authority, the DFLP believes that paving the floor for the substitute national strategy rise requires reinforcing the internal solidarity and strengthening the society’s steadfastness and cohesion in order to be up to the challenges of confronting the occupation, which requires, first of all, a substitute socioeconomic policy; and second, dealing with the expanding gap between the Authority and the people’s mass on a basis of respect to citizen’s freedoms and political and syndical rights. The DFLP affirms that the struggle against the unjust policies, in defense of citizens’ dignity and living and political rights, as well as public and syndical freedoms, is an essential element in the national effort required to guarantee the transition into the new strategy.
As for dealing with Gaza Strip issues, the DFLP believes that Gaza’s salvation from the catastrophe of destruction and siege and the catastrophic deterioration of social and living conditions; opening the crossing points; achieving reconstruction and burying the plans of separating Gaza Strip from the West Bank, requires serious efforts to terminate the division, which can be realized only if associated with broad and synergic national effort and mass pressuring movement. The DFLP also emphasizes the necessity of carrying out a comprehensive national dialogue in Gaza Strip, with a view to activating the national Consensus Government, as an introduction to convene the Temporary Leadership Framework in order to implement the Cairo Agreement, to form a national unity government on the way towards the presidential and parliamentary elections for both the Legislative and National Councils according to the full proportional representation law, and to set the new substitute political strategy into effect.
With regard to the Israeli negotiations, the DFLP thinks that the conclusion to be emphasized, based on the elections’ result and the Right’s and the Extreme Right’s win, is the necessity to turn over the negotiation page and work to draw substitute policies based on the CC Resolutions.
The DFLP views the Arab Palestinian win in the Knesset as a victory to the refugees’ cause and right to return, which requires developing a struggle link between the movement of the Palestinian people over the 1948 territories and the refugees’ movement and defending the right to return in the diaspora areas, developing the link between the struggles of the 1948 territories and the Palestinian people’s struggles through its popular resistance in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and ending the siege of Gaza Strip; these elements show clearly the components of the National Palestinian Temporary Unified Platform based on the people’s unity, as well as the unity of its rights and representation.
In the light of the developments in Yarmouk Camp, the DFLP calls again to form a crisis cell of the EC and to re-form the EC delegation to Syria in order to be a collective one, with a view to neutralizing the Palestinian existence, secure the factors of survival for the refugees and displaced people, and work persistently to set the floor for the refugees to return to their camps.
At the end of its Central Committee’s statement, the DFLP concludes by an invitation to turn over the negotiations page, adopt a new and substitute policy based on the CC Resolutions taken in its last session. It also confirms the invitation to the Temporary Leadership Framework to carry out a political review; develop mechanisms to terminate the division; draw the orientations of work according to the new and substitute political strategy, which combines the cause internationalization and the Palestinian national rights in an international conference sponsored by the SC and according to the relevant UN Resolutions, on one hand, and the struggle on field through a comprehensive popular resistance that may mounts to a national rebellion until the end of occupation and colonization, creation of fully-sovereign and independent Palestinian state within the 4 June 1967 Borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and guarantee the Palestinian refugees’ right to return to their homes and properties, from which they have been displaced since 1948, according to the UN Resolution 194.
The following is the full version of the Report:
The DFLP Central Committee held a session of meetings in the second half of April, 2015, during which it discussed the Palestinian, Israeli and regional situations and the impact thereof on our national cause and our people’s rights. At the end of its meetings, it issued the following Political Report:
The Central Council... a Distinguished Political Station
• The 27th Session of the Palestinian Central Council (March 4-5, 2015) constituted a distinguished Palestinian political station; it came at the eve of the Knesset elections (March 17, 2015) and after one year from the CC previous session. Going in a direction different from what had been said by Mahmoud Abbas, Chairman of the PLO’s EC, in his opening speech, in which he reaffirmed his readiness to resume the negotiations, the CC issued a closing statement, disregarding any direct mention of negotiations, and giving answers to a series of issues that had been subject to disagreement with the official Palestinian leadership.
• In its resolutions, the CC disregarded any direct mention of the negotiations with the Israelis, and called for internationalizing the Palestinian cause and national rights and for an international conference sponsored by the SC and the five great states, with the participation of many concerned States, under the ceiling of the relevant UN Resolutions, with a view to putting an end to the American policy of acting unilaterally and obliging the State of Israeli occupation to abide by the requirements of balanced political settlement, including the withdrawal of colonization and occupation from all Palestinian occupied territories to the 4 June 1967 borders, creation of the fully-sovereign and independent Palestinian State within the 4 June 1967 Borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and guarantee the Palestinian refugees’ right to return to their homes and properties, from which they were displaced in 1948, according to the UN Resolution # 194, in the context of the Palestinian people’s right of self-determination.
• The CC decided to activate the State of Palestine’s affiliation to international agencies, organizations, conventions and protocols, including the International Criminal Court, with a view to holding the Israeli officials accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity they perpetrated against our Palestinian people, expanding the recognition of the State of Palestine and isolating, condemning and litigating the occupation for its actions on the broadest international scope.
• The CC also made a resolution to develop popular resistance in the Palestinian occupied territories and to stop security coordination with the occupation, as well as the economic embargo, because the enemy’s authorities have exaggerated in violating the signed agreements, the international customs and the Palestinian human rights through a series of arbitrary and repressive measures, including land expropriation, colonization, activation of Israelization and Judaization plans in Jerusalem and the occupied West Bank and stopping the transfer of clearance funds to the Palestinian Authority’s treasury.
• In addition to turning over the page of negotiations under the USA unilateral sponsorship according to principles and mechanisms favoring the occupation and outside the international legitimacy, the CC affirmed and reaffirmed the following, among other things:
* Adherence to the sovereign and independent Palestinian State within the 4 June 1967 Borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and guarantee the Palestinian refugees’ right to return according to the UN Resolution # 194.
* Decisive refusal to the so-called “State of Israel’s Judaism;” as well as any solution as a substitute to the sovereign and independent Palestinian State, such as a state with temporary borders, and a separate state in Gaza Strip.
* Sick to the 4 June 1967 Borders, instead of the so-called “agreed on land exchange” and complete stop of colonization.
* Emphasize the invitation to the Temporary Leadership Framework to meet, to draw a new policy that sets the CC Resolutions into effect.
In this context, the CC called the Palestinian Government to issue the necessary resolutions, decrees and laws with a view to putting the CC new policy into effect. It commissioned the EC to follow up the execution of the CC Resolutions and call it for another meeting after three months on the basis of approving the CC’s periodicity of meetings.
Two Policies Concerning the CC Results
• Soon after their issuance, the CC Resolutions became a matter for internal Palestinian argument regarding their binding nature to the PLO and the Palestinian Authority leadership institutions: were they binding resolutions to those institutions, or mere recommendations that the official leadership deals with according to what it deems suitable of tactics? This was reflected in two variant directions:
* The first one represents the majority of the national Palestinian lines, even within Fatah itself, and calls for a new strategic policy to replace the one political option strategy of futile and vain negotiations with the Israelis, under the US unilateral sponsorship, according to imbalanced mechanisms and principles and outside the international legitimacy’s power. In the same context, it calls for a political, administrative and organizational review of all Palestinian conditions, with a view to paving the way for the new and substitute political strategy so that it can be enforced and set into effect on field and at Arab and international political and diplomatic circles.
* The second one still sticks to the old policies and views the CC Resolutions as “mere tactical negotiation cards” that can be resorted to when necessary within a policy, the ceiling of which is relative improvement of the conditions of negotiations with the Israelis under the US unilateral sponsorship. Such improvement, however, will not make a breakthrough regarding the negotiation process bases, mechanisms and references: the resolutions and sponsorship of the international legitimacy within the framework of an international conference, stopping settlement and building on the Resolution # 19/67, necessitating the membership of the State of Palestine in the UN as an observer.
• Though the EC made a decisive resolution in its first meeting after the CC session (19/03/2015), deeming the CC Resolutions as not recommendations, but binding resolutions, and though that was important and many resolutions have been made by the EC to enforce the CC Resolutions, the policy of betting on returning to negotiations, with relative improvement of the conditions, has not been terminated yet; it is still being introduced, this way or that, at the Arab and international circles and even in the day-to-day politics as expressed in the statements of the official Palestinian leadership and those having a close relationship with it.
With the policy of maneuver and delay to enforce the CC Resolutions, the EC meeting has been delayed to become after the Israeli election results (17/03/2015), because there was a bet that the Zionist Bloc and the middle and left Zionist forces would win, which would provide a new chance to resume the negotiations in their old formula; the settlement doubled more than six times since Oslo Accord (1993), when the number of settlers was 97,000 in Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while it is now 600,000 settlers in Jerusalem and the West Bank, and Netanyahu Government will work to expand it throughout the four coming years.
Why the Return to the Inferior Draft Resolution in the SC?
The Right and Extreme Right’s return to power in Israel has, no doubt, played a role in taking a decisive attitude to deem the CC Resolutions binding. At the same time, it aborted any possibility to return to negotiation table in the near future, but that does not mean that things have been decisively settled in favor of the new and substitute national policy as expressed in headlines in the recent CC Resolutions.
• The CC Resolutions have been submitted to the Political Committee and another series of committees to study them without setting a deadline to submit the results to the EC. This can be a place for more delay on the hope that further political developments can be bet on.
• The address delivered by the EC Chairman to the Arab Summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, in which he linked the desistance from the CC Resolution, especially with regard to stopping security coordination with Israel and economic embargo against it, and Israel’s desistance from what he called “violation of the signed agreements.”
• The recent Israeli step of conditionally unfreezing the Palestinian clearance funds, and introducing this step as an Israeli retreat from its violation of the signed agreements in favor of re-abidance by them, which necessitates a similar Palestinian step concerning security coordination with Israel and the economic embargo against it.
• The French initiative to the SC, proposing a draft resolution with many common points, but at a lower level, with the Palestinian-Arab draft resolution, which failed in the voting of 30/12/2014, with some amendments to guarantee the American approval. The visit of Head of the Negotiations Section at the PLO’s EC to Washington to make consultations with the American Administration about the nature of the political initiatives in the region in the light of the CC Resolutions, results of the Israeli elections, the French initiative to the SC and the conditional unfreezing of the Palestinian funds frozen at Israel, comes in this context. All that falls under one ceiling: reviving the political process under America’s unilateral sponsorship.
• The return to the SC, with this inferior Draft Resolution, forms an entry for the USA to realize many goals, after two important events: the first is Likud’s win of the elections; the second is the recent CC Resolutions.
The Israeli elections have resulted in a political obligation that the US has to deal with as a reality. As it is difficult to return to negotiation table under the status quo, the US looks for new strong cards to reinforce its role in the Middle East and to revive the negotiation process without weakening the Israeli position against the Palestinians. Washington thinks that a SC Resolution to resume the negotiations that doesn’t touch the American political ceiling and the Israeli stand limits, as well as Israel’s security and negotiation interests, will constitute a strong card that enables it to continue its role, without forcing Israel to submit to conditions that it doesn’t basically accept.
The US views the efforts for a SC “consensual resolution” as a new means to manage the crisis, with the absence of potentials to resume direct negotiations soon, on one hand, and as an entry to reformulate the international legitimacy resolutions in line with the American perspective, on the other hand.
The most important goal of return to the SC, with an inferior draft resolution, is to dodge the CC Resolutions, which abolished what has been stated in the failing Arab-Palestinian draft resolution to the SC by the end of last year; and the betting to make a new political dispute within the Palestinian lines through the bet to attract some currents, whose policy is still standing on a basis of adherence to the current negotiation process, under the pretext that “if Netanyahu desists from his resolutions, especially fund freezing, we will desist from the CC Resolutions,” or “exploiting the disagreements between the American Administration and Netanyahu.”
• The seriousness of this move to the SC, based on the inferior criteria, proposed to it, stems from the fact that it leads to “reformulating the international legitimacy” and its relevant resolutions. The basis of the new move is dodging the international legitimacy through the enacting f new resolutions and adopting new criteria derived from the American ones for solution and emptying the previous international resolutions of their significance, or dodging them, in case they failed to abolish them, which brings us back to the idea of recognizing the State of Israel’s Judaism in return of the Palestinian State, and legalizing the occupation of others’ lands by force, through the adoption of “land exchange” principle, instead of the “not seizing the others’ lands by force” principle, and brings us back to legitimizing the occupation of East Jerusalem through the confirmation of “Jerusalem as a capital of two States,” and to the notion of a State with temporary borders and diminished sovereignty, under the pretext of guaranteeing Israel security. Thus, the international legitimacy’s resolutions are dealt with in a selective way and are not taken as a package of resolutions aiming at realizing international justice; this “legitimacy” will be restricted to the SC resolution which will adopt this plan, including the call for negotiations as the “only way” to reach a solution and settlement in the region, while it will be prohibited to internationalize the Palestinian cause and national rights, including the resorting to the International Criminal Court, the UN General Assembly and others.
New and Substitute Socioeconomic Policy
In addition to the division and recovering the national unity, guaranteeing the factors of the substitute national strategy rise requires reinforcing the internal line cohesion and enhancing the society’s steadfastness and coherence to face the challenges of confrontation with the occupation, which requires: first, a substitute socioeconomic policy; second, solving the expanding gap between the Authority and the people’s mass on a basis of respect to citizens’ freedoms and political and syndical rights:
• The socioeconomic policy followed by the Palestinian Authority doesn’t fulfill these requirements. This policy led to a decline in the GDP in 2014 and to a bigger decline in domestic product per capita. The Government has not responded to the repeated calls for dialogue with the social and political forces to come to a consensual policy guaranteeing fair distribution of the burden of confrontation with the occupation to all social classes; rather, it resorted to repressing and terrifying means to contain the syndical and protesting movement, adopting a policy that is strikingly biased to the private sector, especially those with large capitals, on the account of the laboring and marginalized groups. The most recent manifestations of this policy have been the amendments made to the income tax system to reduce the taxes imposed on high income people and big companies, while the poor and middle classes are suffering under the burden of indirect taxes and duties which consume a big portion of their originally limited income. In Gaza, Hamas Authority resorted to the same policy to raise many for its bureaucratic and security apparatus at the expense of the laborers and the marginalized.
• These economic policies have been associated with an acute deterioration, which was extraordinarily worsened since 2014, in public liberties both in Gaza and the West Bank. This deterioration has been the result of an attack by the Authority against the freedom of expression, as well as the syndical liberties and rights; it dissolved the Union of Civil Servants and arrested its chairman and his deputy, and there are efforts to enact a law constraining the right of syndical organization and subjugating the unions to Government’s domination and interference. In this context, the presidential legislative powers are being expanded without consultations with the parliamentary blocs in the Legislative Council, the powers of which are being violated, such as dismissing its elected secretary-general. Hamas, on the other side, usurps the Council’s powers through the holding of illegal meetings for its representatives in Gaza, through which it assumes the capacity and powers of the Council’s official sessions, and hence seizes its legislative powers.
Continuing these practices will disunite the Palestinian society, harm its cohesion and weaken its ability to secure the foundations of confrontation with the occupation, which are required by the shift into the new national strategy, whose milestones have been drawn by the CC Resolutions, and thus, it weakens the reliability of moving towards this desired transition. Therefore, the struggle against these unjust policies, in defense of citizens’ dignity and living and political rights, as well as public and syndical freedoms, is an essential element in the national effort required to guarantee the transition into the new strategy.
Ending the Division and Address Gaza Strip Issues
• After one year from the “Shati Reconciliation Agreement,” of which only the formation of a government, that has not assumed its responsibilities in Gaza Strip, has been executed, the bilateral failure (the Government and Hamas) to solve the problem of Hamas civil servants has been the direct reason behind the failure to activate the National Consensus Government, to hand off the crossing points to it and to start unifying security apparatuses, as an entry to implement the “Shati Reconciliation Agreement” which aims to end the division and recover the national unity. The failure of the bilateral joint committee, which contains members from the Government and Hamas, to solve the problem of civil servants and to make one single step forward on the Consensus Government’s agenda, has not only been a failure to the bilateral solution, but reflected a quota conflict over power, a sticking to partisan interests, a lack of political will at both Fatah and Hamas and a submission to regional interests and interferences.
Though the civil servants’ problem deserves being solved to secure job security to every civil servant, before and after the appointments of 2007, Hamas’ sticking to its proposal to solve the civil servants’ issue aims to maintain Hamas’ overall control over Gaza Strip and to keep capturing the security and administrative decision in it.
Hamas tries to perpetuate this control by dealing with plans leading to the separation of Gaza Strip from the West Bank; it shows readiness to consider a five-year truce, independently from the West Bank, in return of a marine passage to break through the Israeli siege; it also tries to solve the electricity problem in Gaza by an Israeli line through Qatar with the approval of Rami Hamdallah Government. Moreover, it is making consultations and communications with figures and forces to administrate Gaza with a view to replacing the deposed government, which resigned apparently after the issuance of the “Shati Reconciliation Agreement.” That comes on the ground of blaming the government of the Palestinian Authority for the cute social crises and problems.
Visits of the Government Chairman, Rami Hamdallah, to Gaza have always been associated with foreign and regional dues, such as Gaza Reconstruction Conference in Cairo or the Arab Summit Conference in Sharm el-Sheikh. These visits have been accompanied with positive atmospheres of progress to remove the obstacles hindering reconciliation, and bilateral efforts and proposals to solve the problems hindering the work with Gaza’s four ministers, while the real goal of such visits is to establish the Consensus Government’s authority and responsibility over both Gaza Strip and West Bank with the approval of Hamas, and to show the intention of the official decision center to achieve conciliation and establish its status in order to receive the donors’ transfers.
• Though the conditions of living are unbearably deteriorating in Gaza, because of the siege, the reconstruction is being delayed and the living crises are aggravating in different appearances; and though the plans of separating Gaza from the West Bank to hit the national plan are intensified; and though the occupation continues its assaults on Gaza and the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and continues the settlement and Judaization at high paces; and though some international powers exploit the declined regional interest in the Palestinian cause to propose inferior plans to solve it, the two sides have not been convinced by the failing experiences of understanding and bilateral solutions to follow the most effective way, that is to follow the national solution which ends the division and removes the obstacles hindering the activation of the Consensus Government and to have a sense of national responsibility to recover the internal unity.
In spite of these risks, the factions’ initiatives to help find a solution are hindered, decision makers (in Fatah) postpone and avoid the meeting of PLO factions in Gaza to carry out a serious and comprehensive dialogue and to develop executive mechanisms for the “Shati Reconciliation Agreement” and deal with the catastrophic social and living problems.
Moreover, weak pretexts are still being raised not to invite the PLO Temporary Leadership Framework to convene, and a responsible and comprehensive national dialogue to develop a joint political platform and solve the difficult issues preventing the execution of Cairo Agreement in 04/05/2011 and the subsequent agreements, is still being hindered.
Our people has lost a new year since the issuance of the “Shati Reconciliation Agreement,” under the cover of mutual maneuvers, in which each side blames the other for hindering the Consensus Government, which is maintained as a tarboosh that Hamas renders responsible for Gaza crises and Fatah insists on its continuation with a view to embarrassing Hamas as the side which rejects reconciliation through its rejection to activate the Government.
• The way of disagreement to solve the fair problem of civil servants, regardless of the aching details, reflects the worst form of struggle for quotas and control over Gaza Strip, and it is a sure prescription to perpetuate the division which feeds on and gets deeper by partisan interests and deriving strength from regional axes and their struggles.
With the continued division and in order to find an alternative to the revenues generated by the “tunnels economy,” Hamas tries to finance its administrative and security apparatuses, particularly to pay the civil servants’ salaries, by imposing taxes on everything that may occur in mind, the most recent one is the social solidarity tax, a tax imposed on basic food stuff, and not luxuries, which exacerbates the problem of high prices, multiplies the burden of conditions of living which are getting worse in Gaza Strip and exacerbates the catastrophe of siege, destruction and division.
The actual potentials to break the siege and start the reconstruction process, which has not made any mentionable progress yet, are declining, while the efforts to correct the relation with Egypt are frozen, and the same applies to its organization by the opening of Rafah Crossing Point, which has been closed for a long time, causing major damages to our people’s interests.
That enhances the division dilemma and reveals, on the other hand, its motives, showing Fatah and Hamas full responsibility for it. Gaza’s salvation from the catastrophe of destruction and siege and the catastrophic deterioration of social and living conditions; opening the crossing points; achieving reconstruction and burying the plans of separating Gaza Strip from the West Bank, requires serious efforts to terminate the division, which can be realized only if associated with broad and synergic national effort and mass lobby movement.
Ending the Division is a National Cause
Reviewing the efforts made to end the division, we affirm the following:
1. Mobilizing the broadest popular pressure on Fatah and Hamas to end the destructive division. This mobilization requires bringing together the efforts and pressure of the social categories most affected by division, such as owners of the destroyed houses, workers of destroyed factories, farmers, especially those located within the security buffer or damaged by the occupation and its assaults, fishers, students, women, university graduates, as well as the various society sectors, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the people hit by the catastrophe of siege, destruction, expensiveness, unemployment, poverty, power cut, etc.
2. As ending the division is a national issue, it is necessary for the popular pressure to cover all places of the Palestinian people’s existence, giving priority to the people of Gaza and the West Bank, because of their importance.
3. Mobilizing the broadest spectrum of national action forces and factions, in both the overall pressure process or for specific issues. In this context, working to form a national committee of ministries, national action factions and civil society organizations to supervise the reconstruction process and break the siege and keep the committee away from the disputes between Fatah and Hamas.
4. Exerting national efforts and pressures to convene a comprehensive national dialogue in Gaza Strip, with a view to activating the Consensus Government and removing the obstacles hindering it, as an introduction to convene the PLO Temporary Leadership Framework in order to implement the Cairo Agreement (04/05/2011), form a national unity government, on the way towards the presidential and parliamentary elections for both the Legislative and National Councils according to the full proportional representation law, and set a unified political strategy.
5. Pressuring the UNRWA to play its role; continue its efforts with the donors to fulfill their obligations towards reconstruction, guaranteeing rents to owners of the destroyed houses and upgrading the services; pressuring the PLO to play its role and organize the relation with Egypt in order to open Rafah Crossing Point permanently and upgrade its functions; intensifying the Government efforts to address the social and living issues in Gaza Strip, such as solving the problem of electricity, poverty and unemployment reduction, approving the 2005-2007 staff, solving the problems of civil servants and graduates, reducing university installments by 50%, recognizing the martyrs and the injured of the war on Gaza, restoring the infrastructure, improving health, education and social affairs services, supporting the refugees of Syria, Libya and Yemen, stopping the security disorder and maintaining the democratic liberties.
Israeli Elections Developments
• Results of the 20th Knesset (17/03/2015) affirmed the estimations that the Israeli society is shifting to the right and the mistake made by public opinion survey centers and institutions, through which they contributed to the illusion of relying on the possibility that the Zionist Alliance (Livni-Hertzog) will win, which will constitute a chance to resume the negotiations with the Israelis without any mentionable change in the principles, references and mechanisms and under the US unilateral sponsorship.
Statements of Netanyahu and his allies from the Right and Extreme Right revealed that betting on the choice of negotiations, as the only choice, and waiting until an opportunity to resume the negotiations is there, would take the region into a long phase of no-negotiation and no-solution, which would provide the Israelis, with their pretenses that there is no Palestinian partner, the necessary cover to continue their policy of expanded settlement projects, arrests, kills, and planting obstacles and difficulties on citizens’ way to worsen their day-to-day life.
The conclusion to be emphasized, based on the Right’s and the Extreme Right’s win in the recent elections, is the necessity to turn over the negotiation page and work to draw substitute policies based on the CC Resolutions taken in its 27th session.
• On the other hand, the Joint Arab List’s win in the elections, in which it came third, highlights many conclusions, the most important of which might be:
1. The importance of internal unity in the framework of the day-to-day confrontation with the occupation State, in the 1948 and the 1967 territories, as well as the diaspora places. Our people in the 1948 territories would have not achieved what they have achieved without their unified action to abort the hidden objectives of the decision taken to increase the determining ratio; these objectives have resulted in negative results to their makers; the Arab vote in the Knesset has advanced, and less Arab votes have gone to Zionist parties.
2. The Arab vote in the Knesset occupies now a new position on the balance of power, which necessitates a new policy to fight through the Knesset, and within the mass movement, which will serve the goals and interests of our people in the 1948 territories, and further contribute to unveiling the racial Zionist policies, which are based on a complete system of discriminatory laws against our people.
3. The Arab Palestinian win in the Knesset must be viewed as a victory to the refugees’ cause and right to return, which requires developing a struggle-link between the movement of the Palestinian people over the 1948 territories and the refugees’ movement and defending the right to return in the diaspora areas.
4. In the same context, and based on the new political strategy, a link between the struggles of our people in the 1948 territories and our people’s struggles through its comprehensive popular resistance in the West Bank and Jerusalem, as well as its struggles to end the siege of Gaza Strip, must be developed.
Our people’s win in the recent Israeli elections, provides a new opportunity to present the components of our National Temporary Platform which stands on the Palestinian people’s unity and protects the unity of its rights and representation.
Yarmouk Camp and the National Role
• On April 1st, a new and serious development occurred in Yarmouk Camp in Syria; invading the Camp by ISIS gunmen, in collusion with Nusra gunmen, to drive away the Aknaf Bait Al-Maqdis groups, take over the Camp and establish a link between the Camp and Al-Hajar al-Asswad, which is dominated by ISIS. These surprising developments, which came at the eve of a talk about the signature of a triple agreement in Yarmouk (between the Government, the Aknaf gunmen and the Palestinian factions) to open a horizon to solve its crisis, revealed, on one hand, the fragile Palestinian official politics, regardless of its orientation, and its lack of a clear vision towards the Camp crisis and how to solve it, “Storm of Confusion;” on the other hand, it showed the popular cohesion in the Camp, (around 18,000 Palestinians still insist on staying there), and their ability to interact with the developments and move in the right direction.
The Palestinian leaderships have lacked a unified stand of the Yarmouk issue and ISIS appearance as a player in the Palestinian crisis. The stands have ranged and varied and failed to provide a basis for a solution that can soon be implemented. The situation became worse because the “president’s representative” himself contributed to the creation of political disorder and confusion, when he adopted the invitation to evacuate the Camp of its people, and to entangle the Palestinians in the struggle in Syria from the Yarmouk Camp gate under the pretext of liberating it by force; these orientations, in general, lead only to the destruction of the Camp and repeat the tragic experience of Nahr Al-Bared Camp. The EC Statement of 09/04/2015, which called for refraining from entangling the Palestinians in the Syrian crisis and for a substitute solution to Yarmouk Camp problem, to remove the political cover of the “official envoy’s” manipulations and to affirm the correctness of emphasizing the necessity to disregard this formula, in favor of a formula standing on the following:
1. Forming a crisis cell from among the EC members to deal with our Palestinian people’s file in Syria, end the policy of unilateralism, confusion and disorder in decision making, draw a well-defined and clear political strategy to be a permanent guide for the Palestinian movement in Syria on the basis of not entangling our people in the Syrian crisis, developing political solutions that alleviate the crisis burdens assumed by our people, provide them with factors of survival in the Camps and help them stick to the Camps and return into them.
2. Forming a collective EC delegation which should be enhanced by local leaderships of PLO factions in Syria, to follow on field our Palestinian people’s issues in Syria regarding the day-to-day relations with the concerned authorities, the UNRWA, the International Red Crescent and other relevant international organizations.
3. Adopting the content of our people’s statement made in Yarmouk Camp on 13/04/2015, which calls for immediate ceasefire, driving the gunmen out of the Camp, returning the people who escaped to the neighboring zones into their Camp, providing them with factors of survival through supplying the Camp with food and medicines, including the creation of a medical point to treat the Camp residents.
Dimensions of Regional Struggles
• With the big explosion of Yemen and the decision made to form a Joint Arab Force, the situation in our region became more complicated and the struggles now go on two levels:
1. The first one is the regional struggle for influence, in the context of redrawing the region’s geopolitical map; this struggle is often ideologically covered by picturing it a confessional struggle, though it is not about religious issues, but about political issues with vital interests, which, at the same time, covers the uprisings, revolutions and movements of peoples for freedom, national sovereignty, democracy and social justice in this country or that.
2. The second level is the Arab and Palestinian – Israeli struggle, whose regional importance has declined to the lowest level on the list of priorities, because the Arab actors became occupied with their regional or internal struggles. There’s no doubt that the political strategy followed by the official Palestinian leadership, which adopts the negotiations as the only way for solution and rejects to adopt alternative choices that the CC has clearly approved in its recent session, as well as the domination of the no-negotiation and no-solution state; these factors together contributed to the declined place of the Palestinian cause on the Arab agenda. The recent Arab Summit in Sharm Al-Sheikh forms a striking example of the nature of Arab concerns and a clear evidence of the declined interest in the Palestinian cause and of the declined importance of the Palestinian/Arab – Israeli struggle to the lowest place on the list of Arab interests.
A Substitute Political Strategy based on the CC Resolutions
• Taking the Palestinian national situation out of the crisis, it is trapped in, will be through stopping the bet on the futile and vain negotiations, the conditions of which are known and low, under the American unilateral sponsorship, and making a decisive decision in favor of a substitute political strategy. The CC Resolutions, taken in its 27th Session, reflect many of such strategy’s headlines which combine the Palestinian cause and national rights’ internationalization and the fight on field, within the framework of a comprehensive popular resistance which may develop to become a comprehensive national rebellion.
Taking a decisive attitude in favor of this Policy requires, at the same time, taking a decisive attitude that stops dealing with the CC Resolutions as a mere card for negotiations, the use of which is aimed to improve partially the low conditions of the futile and vain negotiation process.
• Turning over the page of negotiations under the USA unilateral sponsorship is a basic precondition to change the CC recent resolutions to elements of a new national policy that substitutes the failing policies followed for twenty years, resulted in pure losses to our Palestinian people and formed a cover for the occupation authorities to expand the Israelization and Judaization plans, and practicing the policies of collective arrest, killing, banishment, disturbing the normal life of our people in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and imposing unjust siege and war on it in Gaza Strip.
The necessary entrance into these strategic steps will be through ending the division, recovering the internal unity on a basis of full national partnership, within the framework of a unified national Palestinian platform, the headlines of which are drawn in the recent CC Resolutions.
This necessitates inviting the Temporary Palestinian Leadership Framework to meet urgently, in order to conduct a political review, develop executive mechanisms to end the division and draw action plans for the new and substitute political strategy.
Ending the division, recovering the internal unity, making a consensus on a unified Palestinian national platform and referring to the people through elections covering both the Authority’s and PLO’s institutions under the ceiling of national partnership and according to the full proportional representation law, would, not only end the Palestinian crisis, but would close the doors opened for Arab and regional interferences in the Palestinian internal affairs as well. This would also close the doors in the face of the policies which changed the Palestinian cause to a negotiation card on the regional and international bargaining table, and reframe the Palestinian-Arab and Palestinian-regional and international relations through the official institutions with a view to renewing their legitimacy in our people’s eyes, as well as in the accounts of the different Capitals, through the renewal of our internal unity and building our unified Palestinian national platform. It would also largely contribute to paving the road for the necessary condition to break the siege of Gaza Strip, re-organize the relation with Egypt on a basis of respect to the two sides’ interests and guaranteeing the necessary condition to resume reconstructing what has been destroyed by the Israeli assault. These steps, in the end, blocks the road of the plans introduced as alternatives to the unified Palestinian national one; the plans that aim to separate Gaza Strip from the West Bank, create a State with temporary borders or diminished sovereignty and independence.
An International Conference instead of the American Unilateralism
• On the international level, and based on the CC Resolutions, the new and substitute political strategy starts from the invitation to an international conference under the UN sponsorship with the aim of drawing the necessary mechanisms to enforce the relevant international legitimacy resolutions with a view to guaranteeing our Palestinian people’s legitimate irrevocable national rights, on top which is the fallback of occupation and settlement, creation of an independent sovereign Palestinian State within the 4 June borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, within a defined timeframe which is to be agreed on nationally and on the Arab level, and guaranteeing the Palestinian refugees’ right to return as recognized by the international legitimacy resolutions, particularly the Resolution 194, in the framework of self-determination right to the Palestinian people.
On the same political background, in the political and diplomatic domain, commitment to the CC Resolutions requires the completion and activation of the State of Palestine’s affiliation to international organizations, agencies, conventions and protocols, including the International Criminal Court and the Human Rights Council, with a view to establishing the State of Palestine’s membership and status in the international community’s organizations, on the way towards independence and sovereignty, which would make it possible to hold the Israeli enemy accountable and litigate it for its crimes.
Struggle Strategy on Field
• On field, building a struggle strategy based on the following elements:
1. Stop security coordination with the occupation authorities, which would reformulate the Authority’s position from a sub-agent of the occupation to a factor of support and strength to the popular movement frames in their comprehensive resistance to occupation and settlement.
2. Economic embargo of occupation through gradual steps assumed by the Palestinian Government, which requires disseminating, expanding and upgrading the embargo committees and involving the broadest range of civil society organizations in this battle, in order to monitor the performance of the Government and the economic and trade activities and change the economic embargo battle to a comprehensive national war that sets the foundations for a substitute national economy.
3. Resist the settlement, Israelization and Judaization through the dissemination and development of settlement resistance committees, destroy the Wall, defend the land and pressure the official bodies to provide the support and assistance needed to farmers, peasants and citizens who own lands, houses and real estates under the threat of expropriation.
4. Support the struggles of prisoners in the occupation prisons through the expansion and upgrading of prisoners committee, develop the working mechanisms of the relevant humanitarian, legal and civil organizations and provide the prisoners’ and missing persons’ families with factors of survival.
5. Develop the day-to-day mass struggle forms in the framework of a unified platform, under the leadership of the EC and its competent bodies, coordination committees and partisan national bodies, up to the point of national rebellion against the occupation authorities, in an escalating way that combines the comprehensive mass struggle with the diplomatic and political movement in the relevant international circles.
6. Conduct the necessary policies to maintain the Arab character of Jerusalem against Israelization and Judaization, pursuant to the CC Resolutions.
7. Develop a struggle strategy for the refugees’ movement in asylums and diaspora places, in the framework of the substitute policy, with a view to guaranteeing them civil, social and human rights and confronting the substitute plans regarding the right to return to the homes and properties from which they have been displaced since 1948, which requires modernizing the mechanisms of the PLO’s Section of Refugees Affairs, in cooperation with civil society organizations operating among the refugees.
Glory to homeland, immortality to martyrs and healing to the wounded
2nd half of April, 2015